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Abstract
A great deal has been written about ‘would’ counterfactuals of causal depen-
dence. Comparatively little has been said regarding ‘would’ counterfactuals
of ontological dependence. The standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics is inade-
quate for handling such counterfactuals. That’s because some of these coun-
terfactuals are counterpossibles, and the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics
trivializes for counterpossibles. Fortunately, there is a straightforward exten-
sion of the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics available that handles counterpossibles:
simply take Lewis’s closeness relation that orders possible worlds and unleash
it across impossible worlds. To apply the extended semantics, an account of
the closeness relation for counterpossibles is needed. In this paper I offer a
strategy for evaluating ‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological dependence that
understands closeness between worlds in terms of the metaphysical concept of
grounding.
Keywords Counterfactuals, Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Metaphysical
Laws, Counterpossibles
1. Introduction
When the existence of one entity, e∗, depends on the existence of another, e, we
say that e∗ is ontologically dependent upon e. Ontological dependence is distinct
from causal dependence. Causal dependence is a relation between events across
time; ontological dependence is a relation between entities that exist at a time, or
between entities that lack a spatiotemporal location altogether. For both kinds of
dependence there are true ‘would’ counterfactuals. For instance, if Suzy throws a
rock at a window, causing it to break, the counterfactual ‘if Suzy had not thrown
the rock, the window would not have broken’ appears to be true. But by the same
token, if the existence of the singleton set {2} wholly depends upon the existence of
its urelement, the counterfactual ‘if 2 had not existed, {2} would not have existed’
appears to be true.
The standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics is inadequate for handling all ‘would’
counterfactuals of ontological dependence. That’s because some such counterfactuals
concern entities that exist necessarily, as is the case for the number 2 and its single-
ton, and so are counterpossibles. The trouble is that the standard Lewis-Stalnaker
semantics trivializes for counterpossibles. Fortunately, there is a straightforward
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extension of the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics available that handles counterpossibles:
simply take Lewis’s closeness relation that orders possible worlds and unleash it
across impossible worlds.
Very little has been said about the similarity relation that underpins this exten-
sion of the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics. In this paper, I address this lacuna by offering
an account of the similarity relation for counterfactuals of ontological dependence.
The account is tailored toward counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, but it
applies to counterfactuals with possible antecedents as well. Note that my goal is
just to provide an account of particular judgements of specific ontological dependen-
cies. I am not trying to provide anything like a counterfactual analysis of ontological
dependence in general, or of the metaphysical laws that govern it (if there are any
such laws, more on this later). Indeed, any such analysis along these lines using the
account developed here would most likely be circular. The notion of a metaphysical
law (or as I call it, a grounding law) and the more general notion of grounding are
used to determine the similarity between worlds. Since there is a deep metaphysical
connection between grounding and ontological dependence, and between ontological
dependence and metaphysical laws more generally, a counterfactual analysis of such
notions using the picture presented here would presuppose the very phenomena being
analysed.
I begin by providing a brief recap of the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counter-
factuals and its extension to counterpossibles (§2), before saying a bit about why
it is important to provide an account of the similarity relation that appears in this
analysis, and a bit about the methodology (§3). I go on to offer an account of the
similarity relation for the ‘would’ counterfactuals at issue that understands closeness
between worlds in terms of grounding (§4). I then demonstrate the account on a
toy model (§5). The model represents a range of ontological structures for which
‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological dependence arise and so provides evidence for
the wider applicability of the account. I wrap up in §6.
2. Semantics
Call any counterfactual with the following broad form a ‘would’ counterfactual of
ontological dependence: if e had not existed, e∗ would not have existed (where e
and e∗ either exist at the same time, or lack a spatiotemporal location entirely).
Now, consider the following ‘would’ counterfactual that accompanies the ontological
dependence of {2} on its urelement:
(CP1) If the number 2 had not existed, the singleton set {2} would not
have existed.
If numbers and sets exist then (CP1) seems to be true. On the reasonable
assumption that mathematical objects exist necessarily it follows that (CP1) is a
counterpossible. The standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals cannot
handle counterpossibles. Lewis’s (1973: 424–425) semantics for counterfactuals may
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be stated as follows:
Analysis 1 A → B is true at a world ω iff some possible world in which both
A and B are true is closer to ω than any possible world in which A is true and
B is false, if there are any possible worlds in which A is true.
Closeness is a measure of comparative similarity and is subject to (at least) two
constraints. First: weakness. A closeness ordering of worlds permits possible worlds
to tie for closeness, but any two possible worlds are comparable. Second: centering.
The actual world is the closest possible world to itself, resembling itself more than
any other possible world.
Analysis 1 renders all counterpossibles vacuously true. For instance, consider
(CP1). Numbers are metaphysically necessary entities. So there is no world in
which the number 2 does not exist. So the statement on the right-hand side of
the biconditional in Analysis 1 is trivially satisfied. This might be fine except the
following counterfactual is also true, according to Analysis 1:
(CP1∗) If the number 2 had not existed, my shoes would not have existed.
(CP1∗) is outrageous; the number 2 has nothing to do with my shoes. To avoid
vindicating both (CP1) and (CP1∗) Lewis (1973: 434) notes that the semantics may
be made to range over both possible and impossible worlds (though he resists the
urge to do so). Extending the semantics in this fashion yields the following (Beall
and van Fraassen (2003); Laan (2004); Mares (1997); Nolan (1997) and Restall
(1997)):
Analysis 2 A → B is true at a world ω iff some possible or impossible world
in which both A and B are true is closer to ω than any possible or impossible
world in which A is true and and B is false, if there are any possible or impossible
worlds in which A is true.
As before, closeness is subject to weakness and centering.
Analysis 2 helps because a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent may
have a true antecedent in some impossible world. Accordingly, such a counterfactual
may not be vacuously true when evaluated against both possibility and impossibil-
ity. Indeed, such a counterfactual may not be true at all. Using Analysis 2, then,
there’s scope to make (CP1) true without also making (CP1∗) true. Of course, while
Lewis suggests this extension of his own semantics, his considered view is that coun-
terfactuals with necessarily true antecedents really are vacuously true, and thus his
original semantics gets the right results. Williamson (2013) has recently provided a
defense of this line of thought. I will not engage in this debate here, except to note
that there are now a number of compelling responses to Williamson’s arguments
available (see, for instance, Berto et al. (forthcoming)). If one sides with Williamson
and Lewis and thinks that all such counterfactuals are vacuously true, then one need
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read no further. If one believes as I do that Williamson and Lewis are wrong, and
that the weight of evidence is against them, then read on.
What are impossible worlds? Mares (1997), Priest (2002) and Restall (1997) offer
the same basic answer to this question: whatever the correct metaphysical account
of possible worlds might be, that account can be carried over to impossible worlds.
According to Jago (2015), however, not every metaphysical account of possible worlds
can be generalized in the manner imagined. But all that Analysis 2 requires is the
weaker claim that there is at least one metaphysical account of possible worlds that
applies to impossible worlds as well. This weaker claim is plausible; Jago (2015)
offers one such account, Ripley (2012) offers another.
For now, I will sidestep this issue and simply assume a linguistic ersatz account
of worlds, according to which a world is a set of sentences in an appropriate
world-building language (such as Lagadonian sentences). According to such an
account, a possible world can be defined as follows:
ω is a possible world = df ω is a set S of sentences P1...Pn in a world-building
language that is (i) maximal and (ii) consistent.
Note that by ‘consistent’ I mean ‘negation consistent’, where a set of propositions
is negation consistent when for any proposition A it is not the case that both A and
¬A are members of that set. Note also that by ‘maximal’ I mean to invoke bivalence.
Thus, a set of propositions is maximal when for any proposition A and its negation
¬A, at least one of those propositions is in the set.
Following Bjerring (2014: 333–334), the truth and falsity of a sentence with
respect to a world can be defined as follows:
[Truth] A sentence P is true in a world w iff P ∈ w.
[Falsity] A sentence P is false in a world w iff P /∈ w.
Maximality is then defined as follows:
[Maximality] A set Γ of sentences is maximal iff for all sentences P , either
P ∈ Γ or ¬P ∈ Γ and not both.
Using the above definition of a possible world we can then define an impossible
world as follows:
ω is an impossible world = df ω is a set S of sentences P1...Pn in a world-
building language that is either (i) non-maximal or (ii) inconsistent.
However, this definition of an impossible world is a bit too strong for what I
have in mind; every impossible world is either inconsistent or non-maximal. When
evaluating ‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological dependence it does not seem right
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to perform the evaluation against inconsistent or non-maximal impossibilities. For
instance, suppose that the number 2 exists and that it does so of necessity. Imagining
what would be the case were that number not to exist (as we must do when con-
sidering (CP1)) does not require considering any inconsistent or incomplete worlds.
Rather, we need only consider impossible worlds where numbers do not exist. Such
worlds will differ from any possible world in that mathematical nominalism – as op-
posed to Platonism – is true, but should be perfectly consistent and maximal for all
that.
So the definition of an impossible world must be expanded. Inspired by Nolan’s
(1997: 543–544) discussion of a similar issue, I propose the following refinement:
ω is an impossible world = df ω is a set S of sentences P1...Pn in a world-
building language such that either (i) S is inconsistent or (ii) S is non-maximal
or (iii) there is at least one sentence P ∈ S such that P is assigned a truth-value
that no possible world assigns to P .
Note that what it means to say that there is at least one sentence P ∈ S such that P
is assigned a truth-value that no possible world assigns to P is that there is at least
one sentence P ∈ S such that there is no possible world that has P as a member or,
equivalently, every possible world has ¬P as a member.
The crucial clause is (iii). Suppose that ‘2 exists’ is necessarily true. Given the
above definition, there is a perfectly consistent and maximal world that is neverthe-
less an impossible world, simply because it holds that ‘2 exists’ is false. Call a world
that satisfies clauses (i) or (ii) a nasty impossible world and a world that satisfies
clause (iii) but not clauses (i) or (ii) a nice impossible world. The counterfactuals in
which I am interested require the consideration of nice, and not nasty, impossibilities.
Accordingly, in what follows I will restrict Analysis 2 to possible worlds and nice
impossible worlds.
3. Nixon’s Revenge
So we have a candidate semantics for counterpossibles. On its own, however, Anal-
ysis 2 only takes us so far. Analysis 2 needs to be fleshed out with some account of
the similarity relation it invokes. As Lewis puts the point with respect to Analysis
1:
While not devoid of testable content – it settles some questions of logic – it
does little to predict the truth values of particular counterfactuals in partic-
ular contexts. The rest of the study of counterfactuals is not fully general ...
[Analysis 1] must be fleshed out with an account of the appropriate similarity
relation, and this will differ from context to context. (Lewis (1979: 465)
An account of the similarity relation is an account of the weights that are given to
various respects of similarity between worlds for a particular counterfactual (or class
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of counterfactuals) within a particular context (or class of contexts). With respect
to Analysis 2, what I aim to provide is an account of the respects of similarity
that matter for evaluating counterfactuals of ontological dependence in ordinary
contexts. Broadly speaking, there are two ways to produce such an account. First,
one might decide, independently and for philosophical reasons, which respects of
similarity matter for ontological dependence, and then apply that to Analysis 2.
Second, one might reverse engineer an account of the similarity relation from what we
know about the truth or falsity of ‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological dependence
such that, when combined with Analysis 2, the account gets the truth-conditions
for those counterfactuals right.
Lewis cautions against the first way of proceeding:
The thing to do is not to start by deciding, once and for all, what we think
about similarity of worlds, so that we can afterwards use these decisions to
test [Analysis 1]. What that would test would be the combination of [Analysis
1] with a foolish denial of the shiftiness of similarity. Rather, we must use
what we know about the truth and falsity of counterfactuals to see if we can
find some sort of similarity relation–not necessarily the first one that springs to
mind–that combines with [Analysis 1] to yield the proper truth conditions. It is
this combination that can be tested against our knowledge of counterfactuals,
not [Analysis 1] by itself. In looking for a combination that will stand up to
the test, we must use what we know about counterfactuals to find out about
the appropriate similarity relation–not the other way around. (Lewis 1979:
467)
I will heed Lewis’s advice and take the second approach noted above: I will start
with the truth of counterfactuals and work back to an account of the similarity rela-
tion. Now, it might be thought that it is straightforward to provide such an account.
The similarity relation for ‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological dependence, one
might argue, is just this: the degree of closeness between two worlds is the degree to
which the two worlds agree about what exists. The more that the ontologies of the
two worlds overlap, the closer the two worlds are. The closest worlds are thus the
worlds that have the most similar ontology to the actual world.
However, this simple account fails. A more sophisticated approach is needed.
To see this, consider, again, (CP1). As noted, (CP1) seems to be true: remove
the number 2 from a world, and you must also remove its singleton set. Suppose,
however, we evaluate (CP1) by considering whether a world in which the number 2
does not exist and its singleton {2} does not exist is closer than a world in which 2
does not exist and {2} exists anyway. The trouble comes this way: the singleton {2}
does a lot of work. It is responsible for the existence of the following infinite chain of
sets: {{2}}, {{{2}}}, {{{{2}}}}, {{{{{2}}}}} ... The singleton {2} is also partially
responsible for the existence of any set that has {2} as a member, of which there is
an infinite number as well.
Now, consider the following two worlds: ω1 and ω2. ω1 and ω2 match actuality
exactly except in the following respects. In both worlds the number 2 does not exist.
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In ω1 the singleton {2} does not exist and nor does the infinite chain of sets {{2}},
{{{2}}}, {{{{2}}}}, {{{{{2}}}}} ... In ω2, however, the singleton {2} exists and so
do the sets for which it claims responsibility. According to the simple account, ω2 is
more similar to the actual world than ω1. After all, ω2 is missing just one object (the
number 2), whereas ω1 is missing a whole slew of objects; it has lost a large fragment
of the set-theoretic hierarchy. Thus, according to the simple account, there is some
world in which both 2 and {2} fail to exist that is further away from actuality than
some world in which 2 does not exist and {2} exists anyway. Of course, to show that
(CP1) is false, it must be demonstrated that every world in which both 2 and {2}
fail to exist is further from actuality than some world in which 2 does not exist and
{2} exists anyway. But that is straightforward to show (I leave the details to the
reader).
The case just outlined is a direct analogue of Fine’s (1975) Nixon case, and raises
the same problem. The original Nixon case showed that a simple account of the
similarity relation for ‘would’ counterfactuals of causal dependence won’t do because
it tends to make those counterfactuals false. Similarly, the simple account of ‘would’
counterfactuals of ontological dependence won’t do because counterfactuals that are
intuitively true, turn out to be false on that account. Lewis (1979: 467–475) responds
to Fine by producing a complicated recipe for determining the closeness of worlds.
In the next section I will lay out a similar recipe for ‘would’ counterfactuals of
ontological dependence by modifying the basic ideas underlying the Lewisian picture
(see Kment (2014) for a similar approach, based on explanation).
To be clear, by laying out a recipe for evaluating ‘would’ counterfactuals, I am not
claiming that this recipe should be used as a method for evaluating all counterfactuals
whatsoever, or even all counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. The recipe
is for a particular class of counterfactuals, those implicated in cases of ontological
dependence. One might balk at this: surely a semantics for counterfactuals ought
to be fully general, handling ‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological dependence as a
special case!
In a certain sense, however, the semantics is fully general. The underlying se-
mantics is the closeness semantics specified in Analysis 2. I am assuming for the
sake of argument that this semantics applies to all counterfactuals, and to ‘would’
counterfactuals of ontological dependence as a special case. What I deny is that the
notion of similarity captured by ‘closeness’ is the same notion of similarity for every
counterfactual. Different counterfactuals require different dimensions of similarity for
their evaluation. This is why Lewis does not extend his recipe to all counterfactuals.
Rather, he applies the recipe to a certain class of counterfactuals and is largely silent
about the way we should think about similarity for other types of counterfactuals.
For instance, Lewis does not expect his recipe to work for backtracking counterfac-
tuals (see Lewis (1979: 458)) or for counterfactuals in which the antecedent and
the consequent are not propositions about distinct events (see his response to Kim’s
(1973) in Lewis (1987)).
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4. Grounding and Similarity
Let us begin with Lewis’s (1979) four-step recipe for determining the closeness of
worlds in ordinary contexts:
[i] It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse miracles.
[ii] It is of the second importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region through-
out which perfect match of particular fact prevails.
[iii] It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple miracles.
[iv] It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular
fact, even in matters that concern us greatly. (Lewis 1979: 474)
Where, for Lewis (1979: 469), miracles are defined inter-worldly:
A miracle at ω1, relative to ω0, is a violation at ω1 of the laws of ω0, which are at
best the almost-laws of ω1. The laws of ω1 itself, if such there be, do not enter
into it.
As it stands, Lewis’s recipe is inadequate for evaluating ‘would’ counterfactuals
of ontological dependence, for two reasons. First, Lewis’s definition of a miracle is
typically understood to involve physical laws of nature. The physical laws of nature,
however, do not appear relevant to evaluating ‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological
dependence. Those counterfactuals seem to radically outstrip the physical laws, in
this sense: change the laws as you like and it would still be the case that if 2 did
not exist, then {2} would not exist. Second, Lewis’s recipe is specifically aimed at
matching for spatiotemporal regions. When evaluating counterpossibles regarding
necessarily existing entities such as the number 2, however, matching spatiotemporal
regions seems like the wrong thing to do.
So Lewis’s recipe needs to be modified. In what follows I propose one such
modification. The modification proceeds via the notion of grounding (see Bennett
(2011); deRosset (2013); Rosen (2010); Fine (2012)). First, I’ll first say a bit
about grounding, then I’ll outline the modification. Following Schaffer (2009) I
take grounding to be a transitive, asymmetric, irreflexive, hyperintensional relation
in virtue of which one entity depends upon another. I recognise, of course, that
the formal properties of grounding are controversial: Schaffer (2012) has raised
counterexamples to transitivity; Jenkins (2011) has offered counterexamples to
irreflexivity and Thompson (2016) has outlined counterexamples to asymmetry. For
now, however, I will work with the above ‘standard package’ of grounding features.
I will also assume that an entity x totally grounds an entity y when x is sufficient
on its own to ground y and an entity x partially grounds an entity y when x is not
sufficient on its own to ground y but there is some plurality of which x is a member
that is sufficient to ground y. Total grounding implies necessitation, in at least the
following minimal sense: if an entity e grounds an entity e∗ then, necessarily, if
e exists, then e∗ exists. Grounding can be used to define up the twin notions of
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fundamental and derivative, to wit:
x is fundamental = df nothing grounds x.
x is derivative = df something grounds x.
These two notions are exhaustive: every entity is either fundamental or derivative
and so grounding induces an ordering over the existing things. Instances of ontolog-
ical dependence are assumed to be cases of grounding: in every case of ontological
dependence where the existence of an entity e∗ depends upon the existence of an
entity e, e grounds e∗.
Following Schaffer (2016) and Wilsch (2015) I assume that grounding is not
chaotic; it is rule-governed, in two respects. First, there are grounding regulari-
ties. One important type of grounding regularity is the regular grounding of one
type of entity by another. Examples of such regularities include: the fact that every
number grounds a singleton set, the fact that every truthmaker grounds a truth and
the fact that every part grounds a whole. Second, there are grounding constraints.
One important type of grounding constraint is a constraint on what kinds of enti-
ties something may be grounded in. Examples of such constraints include: the fact
that singleton sets containing numbers are only grounded in the numbers in question
and so cannot be grounded in my shoes; the fact that truths about bees cannot be
grounded in facts about hedgehogs; and the fact that a whole may only be grounded
in its parts, and so cannot be grounded in something else entirely.
Let us call statements of grounding regularities and grounding constraints:
grounding laws. Using the concept of a grounding law, it is possible to define a
grounding miracle as follows:
A grounding miracle at ωm, relative to ωn, is a violation at ωm of the grounding
laws of ωn, which are at best the almost-laws of ωm. The grounding laws of ωm
itself, if such there be, do not enter into it.
By a ‘violation’ of the grounding laws, I just mean:
ωm violates the grounding laws of ωn =df There is some statement L that
is a grounding law at ωn but that is false at ωm.
What are grounding laws, metaphysically speaking? I have no idea, and I have
no intention of defending a theory of such things in this paper. But I also don’t
believe that any deep theoretical understanding of grounding laws is required before
they may be put to work. Rather, following Wilsch, we can gain an intuitive grip
on the concept of a grounding law by way of analogy with physical laws of nature.
Here’s Wilsch (2015: 3294) (who calls grounding laws ‘laws of metaphysics’):
Laws of metaphysics are akin to laws of nature in the sense that they guide
the development of the world along a dimension. Whereas the natural laws
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work along the temporal dimension, the metaphysical laws work along the axis
of fundamentality: from the truths of fundamental physics via the truths of
chemistry, biology, and so on, all the way up.
There are two important parallels between the grounding laws and the physical
laws of nature. First, physical laws define a modality, namely: the modality of
physical necessity. So do the grounding laws. Exactly what that modality is, is up
for debate. One natural thought, however, is that the grounding laws define the
modality of metaphysical necessity either on their own, or in conjunction with a
broader class of metaphysical laws. Second, some physical laws of nature are causal
laws: they describe how one event brings about another event over time. Grounding
laws are like causal laws: they describe how one entity gives rise to another along
the dimension of fundamentality (as Wilsch puts it). Like causal laws, then, the
grounding laws are conditional in nature: they determine how one entity e gives rise
to another e∗, if e exists.
If the reader yearns for a more detailed account of the grounding laws, then the
one that Wilsch (2015; 2016) provides will suffice. According to this account, there
are two kinds of grounding laws: ontological principles and linking principles. Wilsch
(2015: 3301) describes the difference thus (a ‘constructed entity’ is a derivative
entity):
Ontological principles determine which collections of entities give rise to con-
structed entities by means of particular construction operations. Linking-
principles determine which of the constructed objects and properties ‘go to-
gether’ to form facts. The two kinds of principles thus work as a team: on-
tological principles determine the derivative ontology, and linking-principles
determine the derivative facts.
Ontological and linking principles in Wilsch’s parlance are grounding regularities
in mine. It makes sense to expand Wilsch’s account to include what I have called
grounding constraints as well. Translated into Wilsch’s terminology, we might call
these ‘constraint principles’. Ontological constraint principles determine what it is
that a certain type of entity or fact may not be constructed by.
To gain a feel for grounding laws, consider again the number 2 and its singleton,
and consider each of the following specific instances of grounding:
1. If the number 1 exists, then the number 1 grounds the singleton {1}.
2. If the number 2 exists, then the number 2 grounds the singleton {2}.
3. If the number 3 exists, then the number 3 grounds the singleton {3}.
4. If the number 4 exists, then the number 4 grounds the singleton {4}.
...
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5. If the number n exists, then the number n grounds the singleton {n}.
The grounding facts about urelements include all of these particular instances
of grounding, plus the fact that nothing else grounds a singleton set other than its
urelement and whatever grounds that urelement might possess. A basic grounding
law for sets and their urelements may therefore be stated as follows:
(GL1) For any A, if A exists, then A and the grounds for A (if it has any)
ground the existence of {A} and nothing else does.
(GL1) combines a grounding regularity with a grounding constraint: the law dictates
what it is that, together, A and the grounds for A ground, and it also places strong
constraints on what it is that singleton sets may be grounded in.
Note that (GL1) implies at least the following four claims (i) for any A, if A exists,
then something grounds something; (ii) if A exists then the grounds for A ground
something; (iii) every number grounds a singleton set and (iv) every singleton set
grounds a singleton set. However, we should not count these more specific claims –
what we might call mere grounding regularities – as grounding laws.
In order to sort the grounding laws from the mere grounding regularities that
the laws imply we can take a best systems approach. According to the best systems
approach to physical laws, the physical laws of nature are the axioms of the system
that best unifies our beliefs regarding empirical reality. Unification is understood in
terms of a trade-off between strength, understood as deductive power, and simplicity.
A best systems approach to the grounding laws can be sketched as follows. First,
we consider all of our beliefs regarding ontological dependence, roughly: beliefs about
what ontologically depends on what. Next, we consider the grounding laws to be
the axioms of the system that best unifies those beliefs. As before, unification is a
trade-off between strength, understood in terms of deductive power, and simplicity.
The best systems approach selects (GL1) as the law over the mere grounding
regularities that it implies. Each of the regularities that (GL1) implies are more
specific than (GL1) itself, and so imply less. Moreover, these regularities are, at
best, as simple as (GL1) itself. So (GL1) is superior to these other regularities as a
basis for the best system and thus (GL1) alone will be an axiom. The best systems
approach also selects (GL1) over any conjunction of (GL1) with another law. For in
this case, there is a loss of simplicity with no corresponding gain in deductive power.
There is more to say about grounding and the grounding laws, but the basic idea
is, I hope, clear enough: (i) grounding is a relation between entities; (ii) ontological
dependence involves grounding; (iii) grounding is lawful, in this sense: there are
grounding regularities and grounding constraints and (iv) the difference between
grounding laws and mere grounding regularities can be handled via a best systems
approach.
Having introduced the concept of grounding, I will now put it to work. Using the
concept of grounding, a recipe for determining the closeness of worlds may be stated
as follows:
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1. It is of the first importance to avoid grounding miracles.
2. It is of the second importance to maximise perfect match with respect to the
fundamentals.
3. It is of the third importance to maximise perfect match with respect to the
derivatives.
To cast a double slogan: no change to the fundamentals is worth a change to the
derivatives and no change to the laws is worth a change to the fundamentals. In
the next section I will demonstrate the recipe on a toy model. In demonstrating the
recipe I will also explain why it is that avoiding grounding miracles is more important
than matching for the fundamentals and why that, in turn, is more important than
maximising perfect match with respect to the derivatives.
The toy model is a simple, abstract model of a certain kind of structure: a struc-
ture involving entities that depend upon other entities in chains and in a lawful way.
The model is thus structurally isomorphic to a range of realistic cases of ontological
dependence. Indeed, the toy model mirrors the case of 2 and its singleton almost
exactly, and so what I say for the toy model goes for that case as well. On the rea-
sonable assumption that the actual world features well-founded chains of ontological
dependence, the success of the account within the toy model provides evidence for
the success of the account more generally.
Before turning to the toy model, it is important to offer a couple of points of
clarification about the metric. First, with respect to the third line, there are two
ways in which the derivatives might differ between a world ωn and a world ωm. On
the one hand, it may be that there is some derivative entity in ωn that does not exist
in ωm or vice versa. On the other hand, it may be that there is some entity in ωn
that is derivative, and that exists in ωm (but that is not derivative in ωm) or vice
versa. Matching with respect to the derivatives involves differences of the first kind
only. Differences of the second kind, I count as differences in the fundamentals.
Second, it is important to emphasise two differences between my account and
Lewis’s. On Lewis’s account, the evaluation of a counterfactual at the actual world
is broadly insensitive to what the laws are at other worlds. This shows up in his
account of miracles. A world ω features a miracle with respect to the actual world,
when something that is a law actually is not a law in ω. Beyond this, however,
exactly what the laws are in ω doesn’t matter for the closeness of ω. I have used
a notion of a miracle that is analogous to Lewis’s. However, unlike Lewis’s account
it does matter what the grounding laws are at non-actual worlds when it comes to
determining their closeness. That’s because in order to determine the closeness of a
world we must compare the worlds in terms of the fundamentals. But presumably,
we can only know what is fundamental at a world if we know what the grounding
laws are at that world, since it is the grounding laws that tell us what grounds what.
It is useful to spell out this difference a bit further. Consider the closest world
in which raising my hand at time t violates an actual law, and in which the past up
until t is the same as it is actually. Suppose that, after the hand-raising, the world
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evolves in accordance with the actual laws. We might well speculate that the laws in
this world are the same as the actual laws. But, for Lewis, this is mere speculation
and makes no difference to the truth of a counterfactual about my hand raising. On
my account, by contrast, we must hold fixed as much as we can about the actual
grounding laws in the closest world. This is not to say that differences in grounding
laws between worlds are automatically counted as miracles. The idea, rather, is that,
setting aside whatever grounding miracles there might be, we need to hold fixed the
grounding laws in order to compare worlds with respect to the fundamental and
derivative entities in lines 2 and 3 of the recipe.
The second difference between Lewis’s account and my own has to do with what
it takes to violate a grounding law. For Lewis, a law of nature at a world ω1, say
that all Fs are Gs, is violated at a world ω2 just in case there is an F at ω2 that is
not a G. The grounding laws are not necessarily violated in the same way. Consider
a grounding law that connects the number 2 to the singleton {2}. There might well
be an impossible world in which both 2 and {2} exist, and yet the grounding law in
question is violated because there is no grounding relation between the two entities.
Is there a problem for my account lurking in these differences with Lewis’s view?
One might think so, at least with respect to the first difference. When comparing
worlds for the purpose of evaluating a counterfactual of ontological dependence, we
must consider only those impossible worlds in which there are grounding laws and
in which there is grounding. Otherwise, there is little sense to be made of the
metric. We cannot compare worlds with respect to fundamentals and derivatives if
a world lacks grounding, given how ‘fundamental’ and ‘derivative’ are being defined.
But then one might worry that, when evaluating the relevant counterfactuals, I am
holding fixed facts about grounding in a troubling manner.
To see the worry more clearly, consider that in Lewis’s metric he makes reference
to spacetime. One might raise a similar worry: isn’t he holding fixed spatiotemporal
relations when proposing this metric and isn’t this a problem? But, of course, for
Lewis all worlds are spatiotemporal, that is how they are defined. So these relations
need to be held fixed, but for a principled reason: because it is a background con-
straint on Lewis’s theorising that all of the worlds share the same spatiotemporal
relations. By contrast, it is not the case that impossible worlds are defined in terms
of grounding. So we cannot take the features of grounding to be a background con-
straint on theorising in the same way. We need some further reason to hold these
features fixed.
We also need to avoid holding fixed these features for the wrong reasons. Here’s
an example of the wrong reason to hold the relevant features fixed: features of
grounding are metaphysically necessary and we should hold fixed all metaphysically
necessary facts when evaluating counterfactuals of ontological dependence. That is
the wrong reason because, when considering impossible worlds, there is no presump-
tion in favour of metaphysically necessary facts.
Of course, one could just take features of the grounding relation like asymmetry
to be encoded by the grounding laws. The requirement to hold these features fixed
would thus be captured by the first line of the metric. But I don’t want to make this
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assumption. There is nonetheless a good reason to hold those features fixed. Doing so
is needed to ensure that the account yields the right truth-values for counterfactuals
of ontological dependence. For instance, consider the asymmetry of grounding. Now,
take the number 2 and its singleton {2} and consider a world in which 2 does not
exist but in which {2} and {{2}} symmetrically ground each other. Such a world
may be very close to the actual world, given that it differs very little in terms of the
fundamentals (only 2 is missing, assuming it is fundamental) and, arguably, it doesn’t
violate any grounding laws (though this depends a bit on whether the grounding laws
are asymmetric). So it looks to be a contender to be the closest possible world, which
has the potential to undermine the truth of (CP1). This outcome is avoided if we
ensure that the closest impossible worlds to the actual world are all maximally similar
with respect to grounding itself. To do this, we should hold fixed that grounding is
asymmetric; not because this is a necessary truth about grounding, but because it
pre-selects the right set of impossible worlds. This is no different to other dimensions
of the similarity relation which are reverse-engineered in the same way.
As noted, the requirement to hold fixed something about grounding is encoded
by the second line of the metric. It could be argued, however, that the second line
actually under-specifies how much of grounding is to be held fixed. While we must
hold fixed that ‘fundamental’ and ‘derivative’ are defined in terms of grounding,
perhaps we can do that without holding fixed features of grounding like asymmetry.
One way to handle this issue is to add a further line to the metric, one that demands
similarity in terms of grounding itself, which is then given primary importance. For
my part, however, I am inclined to shift the requirement to hold grounding fixed
into the context of evaluation. Thus, I will assume in what follows that in ordinary
contexts in which a counterfactual of ontological dependence is evaluated, one holds
fixed the relevant features of grounding (such as asymmetry) in order to conduct the
evaluation.
5. A Toy Model
This section proceeds in three stages. First, I will outline the toy model (§5.1).
Following that I will show how to evaluate a ‘would’ counterfactual of ontological
dependence against the toy model (§5.2). Finally, I will use the toy model to explain
why it is that the recipe outlined above requires matching for grounding laws first,
fundamentals second and derivatives third (§5.3).
5.1. ω0
Consider the following world ω0. In ω0, there exist four entities: a, b, c and d, which
correspond to the entity types A,B,C and D respectively. The world is governed by
the following grounding laws:
1. If A’s exist, then A’s ground B’s and C’s.
2. If B’s exist, then B’s ground C’s.
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3. Only A’s may ground B’s.
4. Only A’s and B’s may ground C’s.
The grounding structure of the situation is as follows:
1. a grounds b.
2. b grounds c.
3. a is not grounded in anything.
4. d is not grounded in anything.
The world ω0 may be modeled as follows:
a
b
c
d
Figure 1
ω0: arrows represent grounding relations, with the direction of the arrow
corresponding to the direction of grounding. Labeled nodes represent entities.
In ω0, c’s existence depends on b’s because b grounds c. So, consider the following
‘would’ counterfactual of ontological dependence:
(CP2) If b had not existed, c would not have existed.
(CP2) ought to be true in ω0 world: removing b from ω0 world should force the
loss of c as well. If we use the simple account as the basis for evaluating (CP2), we get
the wrong result. Recall that, according to the simple account, the closest worlds to
ω0 are the worlds with the most similar ontology. Given the simple account, a world
in which b does not exist, but c exists anyway is closer to ω0 than a world in which
b does not exist and c fails to exist as well. That’s because there are two ontological
differences between ω0 and a world in which b does not exist and c does not exist
(the lack of b and the lack of c), whereas there is only one difference between ω0 and
a world in which b does not exist and c exists anyway (the lack of b). The reasoning
here reflects the Nixon case outlined in the previous section exactly.
Analysis 2 in combination with my three step recipe for ordering worlds vin-
dicates (CP2). The evaluation of that counterfactual proceeds as follows. First, we
take the set of worlds in which neither b nor c exist. Call such worlds the W1 worlds
(henceforth I will use ‘W’ to refer to types of worlds, reserving ‘ω’ for specific worlds).
Next we identify the set of worlds in which b does not exist but c exists anyway. This
set of worlds divides into two broad kinds, depending on how c is recovered. First,
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c may be recovered in the absence of b by being added as a new fundamental entity.
Call these the W2 worlds. Second, c may be recovered in the absence of b by being
added as a derivative entity, one that is grounded in something other than b. Call
these the W3 worlds. Since there is no alternative way to recover c in the absence
of b, there are no other worlds to consider when evaluating (CP2). Accordingly, if
there is some W1 world that is closer than any W2 or W3 world, then (CP2) is true,
and if not, then not.
In order to proceed further with the evaluation of (CP2), I need to say a bit
more about each of the worlds just specified. With respect to W1 worlds, W2 and
W3 worlds, all three types of world divide into two further kinds, depending on how
b has been removed. On the one hand, b may be removed by removing a – the
fundamental entity that grounds it – thereby excising the entire grounding chain
that gives rise to b. On the other hand, b may be removed by keeping a in place and
violating the grounding law that if A’s exist, then A’s ground B’s and C’s. Let us
call those W1, W2 and W3 worlds in which b has been removed by removing a the
W1.1,W2.1 andW3.1 worlds. And let us call thoseW1,W2 andW3 worlds in which b
has been removed by keeping a in place and violating the grounding law that if A’s
exist, then A’s ground B’s and C’s, the W1.2, W2.2 and W3.2 worlds.
With respect to theW3 worlds, there are two ways to re-introduce c as a derivative
entity: ground it in something that exists in ω0 and potentially break a grounding
law (namely the law that forbids the grounding of c in something other than A’s and
B’s) or ground it some new entity, e. I won’t consider worlds in which c is grounded
in some new entity e here. Grounding c in e will require breaking a grounding law,
so such worlds are at least as far away as worlds in which c is grounded in something
that exists in ω0 (something that does not ground c in that world). However, worlds
in which c is grounded in some new entity e will also require either a new fundamental
(if e is fundamental) or a new derivative (if e is derivative). Adding e and using it
to ground c does not reduce the number of differences between W3 worlds and ω0.
Having specified each world more fully, let us now suppose that W1, W2 and W3
worlds differ only from ω0 in so far as they must in order to possess the features out-
lined above. To get a feel for what each world looks like, it is useful to catalogue the
differences between each world specified and ω0. In doing so, I will count differences
between worlds as follows.
1. A world ωm differs from a world ωn with respect to the grounding laws, when
ωm possesses a grounding miracle with respect to ωn or vice versa.
2. A world ωm differs from a world ωn with respect to the fundamentals, when the
set of fundamental entities at ωm differs from the set of fundamental entities
at ωn.
3. A world ωm differs from a world ωn with respect to the derivatives, when there
is some entity that exists at ωm and is derivative in that world that does not
exist at ωn or vice versa.
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Now, consider theW1 worlds. InW1.1 worlds, a, b and c do not exist. Compared
to W0 worlds, then, W1.1 worlds possess two differences with respect to the
derivatives, one difference with respect to the fundamentals and no differences with
respect to the grounding laws, since none are violated in order to remove b. In W1.2
worlds, by contrast, a exists while b and c do not. Compared to ω0, then, W1.2
worlds possess two differences with respect to the derivatives, no differences with
respect to the fundamentals and one difference with respect to the grounding laws,
since a law must be violated in order to keep a and remove b. W1.1 and W1.2 worlds
are represented in Figure 2.
d
W1.1 Worlds
a d
W1.2 Worlds
Figure 2
W1 worlds.
Consider, next, the W2 worlds. In W2.1 worlds, c exists and is fundamental and
neither a nor b exist. So compared to ω0, W2.1 worlds possess two differences with
respect to the fundamentals, one difference with respect to the derivatives and no
differences with respect to the grounding laws, since none are violated in order to
remove b.
In W2.2 worlds, by contrast, c exists and is fundamental, a exists and b does not
exist. So compared to ω0, W2.2 worlds possess one difference with respect to the
fundamentals, one differences with respect to the derivatives and one difference with
respect to the grounding laws, since a law must be violated in order to keep a and
remove b. The W2 worlds are represented in Figure 3.
c d
W2.1 Worlds
a c d
W2.2 Worlds
Figure 3
W2 worlds.
Consider, finally, theW3 worlds. InW3.1 worlds, a and b don’t exist, but c exists
and is grounded in something that exists in W0 worlds. Since only d is available
for grounding c, that work must be done by d. Compared to ω0, then, W3.1 worlds
possess one difference with respect to the fundamentals, one difference with respect
to the derivatives and one difference with respect to the grounding laws, since if d
grounds c, then the law ‘only A’s and B’s may ground C’s’ must be violated in order
to allow d to do this grounding work.
In W3.2 worlds, a exists but b does not exist, and c is grounded in something
that exists in ω0. The smallest change we can make in order to ground c is to
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ground it in a, since no grounding miracles are required to do so (larger changes will
only make the world further away from ω0 and it is the closest worlds we want to
consider). Compared to ω0, then, W3.2 worlds possess no differences with respect to
the fundamentals, one difference with respect to the derivatives and one difference
with respect to the grounding laws, since the law ‘if A’s exist, then A’s ground B’s
and C’s’ must be violated.
c
d
W3.1 worlds
a
c
d
W3.2 worlds
Figure 4
W3 worlds.
The differences betweenW1, W2, W3 worlds and ω0 are summarised in Table 1.
World Grounding Miracles Differences in Fundamentals Differences in Derivatives
ω0 0 0 0
W1.1 0 1 2
W1.2 1 0 2
W2.1 0 2 1
W2.2 1 1 1
W3.1 1 1 1
W3.2 1 0 1
Table 1: Worlds for evaluating (CP2) in W0.
5.2. ‘if b had not existed, c would not have existed’
We are now in a position to show that (CP2) is true. According to Analysis 2,
(CP2) is true when some world in which b does not exist and c does not exist is
closer than any world in which b does not exist and c does exist. If we apply my
three-step recipe for determining closeness between worlds, then the list of worlds
in Table 1 may be re-ordered in terms of closeness to ω0 as follows:
World Grounding Miracles Differences in Fundamentals Differences in Derivatives Rank
ω0 0 0 0 1st
W1.1 0 1 2 2nd
W2.1 0 2 1 3rd
W3.2 1 0 1 4th
W1.2 1 0 2 5th
W3.1 1 1 1 6th
W2.2 1 1 1 7th
Table 2: ω0, W1, W2 and W3 worlds ordered using a three-step recipe that
prioritises matching grounding laws then fundamentals then derivatives.
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In Table 2, those worlds that match ω0 with respect to the grounding laws are
the most similar worlds. Because a W1.1 world is closer than any W2 or W3 world,
it follows that if b had not existed, c would not have existed. The three-step recipe,
then, yields the right result for the toy case.
5.3. Alternative Recipes
Above I promised to explain two features of the recipe: first, why it is that matching
with respect to the grounding laws is more important than matching with respect to
the fundamentals and, second, why it is that matching with respect to the derivatives
is of the least importance.
Both features of the recipe can be explained using the toy case. First, however
it is important to answer a prior question, namely: why are there any priorities in
the recipe at all? The answer to this prior question is straightforward. If there are
no priorities in the recipe, then W1, W2 and W3 worlds will be ranked with respect
to ω0 worlds simply in terms of the total number of differences between those worlds
and ω0. When differences in the derivatives, fundamentals and grounding laws are
weighed equally, (CP2) is false. That’s because there is no world in which b does
not exist and c does not exist that is closer than any world in which b does not exist
and c does exist; aW3.2 world is the closest world to ω0. To see this, simply re-order
Table 1 to weigh these three aspects equally. The point generalises beyond the toy
case: if fundamentals, derivatives and grounding miracles have equal weight, those
worlds that match actuality with respect to the derivatives will tend to dominate all
other worlds for closeness. In light of the Nixon case from §3, this is precisely what
we want to avoid. So a system of priorities is needed.
Given that there needs to be some prioritisation between differences in the funda-
mentals, grounding laws and derivatives why prioritise the grounding laws over the
fundamentals? To answer this question, suppose we prioritise the fundamentals over
the grounding laws. This alternative recipe gets the wrong results in the toy case.
That’s because, once again, there is no world in which b does not exist and c does
not exist that is closer than any world in which b does not exist and c does exist;
a W3.2 world is the closest world to ω0. Again, to see this simply re-order Table 1
so that matching with respect to the fundamentals is prioritised. Such a re-ordering
ranks a W3.2 world more highly than any other world. So matching the grounding
laws should be more important than matching the fundamentals.
This brings us to the second of the two questions posed above: why prioritise
matching the grounding laws and the fundamentals over matching the derivatives?
There are two ways to alter the priority weighting so that matching the derivatives
is more highly valued. We could either value derivatives more highly than any other
feature, or we could allow that the grounding laws are of primary importance and
then value derivatives over fundamentals. Both recipes yield the wrong results. When
the derivatives are prioritised above all else, either aW3.2 world or aW2.1 world is the
closest world to ω0 (depending on whether fundamentals are weighed more heavily
than the grounding laws or vice versa). When the derivatives are prioritised over
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the fundamentals, a W2.1 world is the closest world to ω0. In both cases (CP2) is
false. Because there is no other way to value the derivatives over the fundamentals,
it follows that matching the fundamentals should be more important than matching
the derivatives.
6. Conclusion
My three-step recipe – when combined with Analysis 2 – correctly yields the result
that (CP2) is true. It can be shown that the account yields the right result in the
example of 2 and {2}, in essentially the same way (I will forego the details). The
account is also immune to Nixon-style counterexamples. Nixon cases for ‘would’
counterfactuals of ontological dependence all have a similar structure. As noted,
a ‘would’ counterfactual of ontological dependence is a counterfactual with the fol-
lowing broad form: if a had not existed, b would not have existed. A Nixon-style
problem for such counterfactuals can therefore be constructed as follows. First, iden-
tify a range of entities c1...cn that depend for their existence on b in the actual world
(if there are any such entities). Second, consider two kinds of world: (i) a world in
which a does not exist, b does not exist and the cn do not exist (aW1 world), and (ii)
a world in which a does not exist and b does exist, along with the cn (a W2 world).
Third, note that aW2 world is more similar to actuality than anyW1 world because
the cn exist in W2 and not in W1. Finally, conclude that ‘if a had not existed, b
would not have existed’ is false because there is no world in which a does not exist
and b does not exist that is closer than any world in which a does not exist and b
does exist.
According to my three-step recipe a W2 world in the construction just specified
will always be further away from actuality than aW1 world in that construction and
so the case fails at the third step. That’s because a further change must be made to
a W2 world in order to reintroduce b and, with it, the cn in the absence of a. Either
some grounding law will need to be broken, because b is grounded in something that
does not ground it actually in aW2 world, or there will need to be some difference in
the fundamentals, because b is fundamental in a W2 world and not actually. Either
way, these differences will outweigh the similarity bought back by recovering the cn,
rendering the ‘would’ counterfactual ‘if a had not existed, b would not have existed’
true.
One limitation of the toy model is that it features only well-founded chains of
ontological dependence, and so does not demonstrate the applicability of the recipe
to ontological structures that feature infinite descent. Moreover, it is unclear that
the recipe is applicable to these cases in principle, given that it relies on the priority
of fundamentals. However, even if, ultimately, nothing is fundamental, this does not
render the account of the similarity relation that I have provided useless. For even
if nothing is actually fundamental, one can assume within a context that something
is fundamental by treating a particular part of a chain of ontological dependence as
the terminus. One can then contextually restrict interest to laws that govern just
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that fragment of the ontological chain one has isolated. In this way, the evaluation
of ‘would’ counterfactuals can proceed as in the toy model.
Still, it would be nice to have a recipe that works equally well for cases of infinite
descent and cases in which something is fundamental. But perhaps that is just too
much to ask. It may turn out that we need different accounts of the similarity relation
to handle these two types of cases. I leave this as an open question. For now, it is
enough to note that the recipe works for a particular type of ontological structure
and that it is a common enough view that this type of structure is widespread. The
upshot being that the recipe will work for a number of ‘would’ counterfactuals of
ontological dependence.
I recognise, of course, that there may be other recipes that would work just as
well. That being said, the present recipe is quite a natural one to use. For the recipe
appeals to facts about grounding and fundamentality that are important to under-
standing ontological dependence more generally. When we evaluate counterfactuals
of ontological dependence in this way, we are therefore evaluating them in terms
that appear quite relevant to the counterfactuals at issue. At any rate, I welcome
the suggestion of alternative recipes. Thinking through each such recipe helps us to
gain a better understanding of ‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological dependence.
Gaining a better understanding of these ‘would’ counterfactuals is important. A
great deal of reasoning within philosophy makes use of these counterfactuals in one
way or another.
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